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Game-theoretical models where the rules of the game and the interaction structure both coevolves with the
game dynamics—multiadaptive games—capture very flexible situations where cooperation among selfish agents
can emerge. In this work, we will discuss a multiadaptive model presented in a recent Letter [Phys. Rev. Lett.
106, 028702 (2011)], and generalizations of it. The model captures a non-equilibrium situation where social
unrest increases the incentive to cooperate and, simultaneously, agents are partly free to influence with whom
they interact. First, we investigate the details of how the feedback from the behavior of agents determines
the emergence of cooperation and hierarchical contact structures. We also study the stability of the system to
different types of noise, and find that different regions of parameter space show very different response. Some
types of noise can destroy an all-cooperator state. If, on the other hand, hubs are stable, then so is the all-C
state. Finally, we investigate the dependence of the ratio between the timescales of strategy updates and the
evolution of the interaction structure. We find that a comparatively fast strategy dynamics is a prerequisite for
the emergence of cooperation.
PACS numbers: 02.50.Le,89.75.Hc,89.75.Fb,87.23.Ge
I. INTRODUCTION
An open question in both biology and the social sciences
is how cooperation and the network of social interactions co-
emerge in a population of selfish individuals. Game theory is
the basic theoretical framework to investigate such phenom-
ena [2]. Furthermore, game theory is a language for describ-
ing systems in biology, economy and society where the suc-
cess of an agent depends both on its own behavior and the
behaviors of others. Through the development and the study
of different types of models, researchers have captured differ-
ent game-theoretic scenarios. Our previous work [1] showed a
new direction, relaxing constraints of other models with feed-
back at different levels to the behavior of the agents. This class
of systems can be anticipated to show a rich behavior and
be interesting for interdisciplinary studies of social systems.
In this paper, we study the multiadaptive game of Ref. [1] in
greater detail and, primarily, extend and simplify it in various
ways to paint a fuller picture of the class of models that the
model in Ref. [1] belongs to.
We motivate our multiadaptive model as an extension of
spatial social dilemmas—systems driven by a conflict be-
tween collective and individual interests, and the interaction
happen between agents that are close in space. More specif-
ically, we start from the Nowak–May (NM) game [8] that is
technically on the border between the Prisoner’s dilemma and
Chicken games. It captures social situations where at any time
it is most rewarding to defect. However, in some situations, in
a long-term perspective, agents benefit from establishing mu-
tual cooperation. More mathematically, each agent can take
two actions: defect (D) or cooperate (C). Cooperation means,
in this context at least, that the agents do what is best for the
community. An encounter in the NM game gives zero pay-
off to anyone interacting with a defector (D), payoff one to
a cooperator (C) meeting another cooperator, and b > 1 to a
D meeting a C. In the literature, people have used this model
to explain the emergence of cooperation among selfish agents
in a vast number of disciplines—political science, economics,
and biology [2].
In the original NM game, the game rules, as parameterized
by the payoff matrix, are fixed in time. In real-world systems,
there could well be a feedback mechanism from the overall
success of the agents, i.e. the society, to the payoff matrix.
Imagine for instance that there is a stable, widespread coop-
eration that builds up a common wealth among the agents. In
such a situation, there would be more common resources at
stake at every interaction, and thus a larger temptation to de-
fect. The easiest way to incorporate feedback from the entire
system to the game rules is to let the entries of the matrices
be variables that are dependent on external environment (the
society in socioeconomic game theory, the environment for
evolutionary models). This is what we will do and, following
Ref. [3], we define
b(t + 1) = b(t) + α[ρ(t) − ρ∗], (1)
where t is the discrete simulation time, ρ is the fraction of co-
operators, ρ∗ ∈ [0, 1] is a model parameter signifying a neutral
cooperation level, and α > 0 sets the strength of the feedback
from the environment to the payoff. The idea behind this form
is that a high cooperation level means the society gets rich
which should increase the incentive to exploit this richness,
and thus increase b. This is not supposed to be regarded as
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2a universal mechanism; rather a scenario that could apply to
a restricted set of social or environmental situations. The lin-
ear response form is motivated by simplicity; one could also
imagine a threshold response (in analogy to other models of
response to social influence [4]).
The other feature we leave flexible and adaptive is the in-
teraction structure (cf. Refs. [5–7]), i.e. the social network be-
tween the agents. In the spirit of the “strength of week ties”
idea [9], we assume the environment of people can be differ-
entiated into strong local ties to family and work colleagues
that are hard to break and of little use when it comes to chang-
ing ones social situation, and weak ties that helps to reach
information, or to build new social ties, further in the social
network (the motivating example was how people find new
jobs). In our model, we will also have local ties that do not
change. To keep the similarity to the NM game we let them
be the four neighbors of a square grid. In addition to the local
ties, each agent has one connection that could reach anyone
outside of the neighborhood. The agents, we assume, use this
“weak tie” to optimize their position in the social network by
connecting it to it best-performing neighbor (including neigh-
bors of the weak, long-range link, so that this link can wander
off, away from the local surrounding of strongly connected
links). This setup, inspired by Ref. [6] will be described more
algorithmically below.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II,
we define what we call the adaptive model essentially the sce-
nario above without the social-network dynamics. In this sec-
tion, we also analyze this model numerically. In section III
we present and investigate the full, multiadaptive model, in-
cluding the emergence of cooperation and social structure. In
Sec. IV, we study the response of a system on noise and, par-
ticularly, the stability of all-C state. We investigate the role of
timescale differences between updating strategy and rewiring
non-local links in Sec. V. Finally, in Sec. VI, we discuss our
results and open problems.
II. ADAPTIVE MODEL
In this section, we will successively move from the NM
game toward the multiadaptive game mentioned above. First,
we will include feedback from the environment—the overall
wealth of the agents—to the rules of the games as parameter-
ized by the payoff matrix. Later we will investigate the case
where an agent has a long-range link (which, in this section,
is not open to optimization).
The basic set-up is an L × L square grid of agents interact-
ing with their four nearest neighbors. We let this square grid
have fixed boundary conditions, so that an agent in the inte-
rior interacts with four others, an agent on the links interact
with three others and an agent in the corners interact with two
others. Unless otherwise stated, we will use L = 100. As
mentioned above, the global state of the system is determined
by the temptation to defect b(t, ρ) given by Eq. (1). The initial
value b0 of the temptation is another parameter value of the
model.
Starting from a random configuration of defectors and co-
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Parameter dependence of the game as seen
in the temptation and average cooperator density on a square lattice
(left panels). Right panels shows the results adding non-local links.
Panels (a) and (b) show average density of cooperators ρ¯, as a func-
tion of the initial temptation b0, with α = 0.1, 2, and 4. The bar
represents points averaged over the last 1000 of 5000 (c) and (e) and
500 of 1000 (d) and (f) steps. Panels (c) and (d), and (e) and (f) cor-
respond to the time evolution of ρ¯ and b¯, respectively, for different
values of b0 when α = 4. Panels (g) and (h) show the diagram over
the three regions in α–b0 space. The curves are averages over 104
runs.
operators in the population, we update the system first by cal-
culating the total payoff of an agent i as the sum of the payoffs
obtained in the last, synchronous, interaction,
ui =
N∑
j=1
ui jAi j (2)
where ui j is i’s payoff from the NM game in the interaction
with j, and Ai j is the adjacency matrix, whose value is 1 (or
0) depending on whether (or not) i and j are neighbors in the
social network. When the payoff is gleaned the agents, once
again synchronously, chose strategies (whether to cooperate
or defect). If an agent i has a higher total payoff than its neigh-
bors nothing happens. But, if an agent j, with an link to i has
3a higher total payoff, then i use the same strategy in the next
timestep as j just did with a transition probability given by [6],
Π(i→ j) = 1
1 + e−β(u j−ui)
. (3)
Here β parameterizes the noise in the choice of whom to
imitate. This type of selection noise is further discussed in
Ref. [10]. Except in Sec. IV, we use β = 1.
In Fig. 1, we give numerical results summarizing the behav-
ior of the model. In panel (a), we display the average coopera-
tor density, ρ¯, as a function of b0 for three values of α. If α = 4
and b0 < 4.0, we can see the system converging to a state with
ρ¯ ≈ ρ∗ = 1/2. This behavior holds through a region of the
parameter space that we denote I. For large b0-values, there is
a transfer to another behavior—region III—characterized by a
vanishing cooperation. We call the value where this happens
bI,III. bI,III, we note, increase with α. This means that if the
coupling between the overall behavior and the payoff matrix
gets stronger, defection needs higher initial temptation values
to take over the population. Between regions I and III there is
a region II∗ where, depending on b0, the cooperation density
either converges to ρ∗ or 0 with probabilities depending on α
and b0. (We save the notation II for another behavior that will
be discussed below.) With increasing b0, the probability that
the system ends in ρ∗ decreases, and vanishes completely at
bII∗,III. In Figs. 1(c) and (e), we display trajectories of ρ and b,
averaged over 104 runs, for b0 = 2.5, 5.5, and 9.0 with α = 4.
These curves show that the system stabilizes to a steady co-
operation level after an oscillatory transient. In terms of con-
figurations, such oscillations are manifested as growing and
shrinking C or D clusters. This can be explored further with
our Java applet of the model [11]. For all parameter values
we study, the oscillatory behavior will be dampened to a fixed
point at (or, at least, very close to) ρ∗. An interesting obser-
vation is that in region I the temptation can be controlled by
the feedback so that the final density of cooperators ρ∗ is at
some intermediate value between 1 and 0 (that is, both C and
D clusters coexist in the fixpoint). Dynamically, region III is
characterized by the system hitting the fixed point ρ = 0 faster
than the environment can respond by tuning the value of b. In
Fig. 1(g), we plot the boundaries between the regions in the
α–b0 plane. We identify region I numerically as when ρ¯, at
convergence, deviates less than 0.5% from ρ∗, in other words
that |ρ¯−ρ∗| is less than half a percent. The region III identified
to when the ρ¯ < 0.005. From Fig. 1(g) we see that the bound-
ary value, bI,II∗ , separating region I from II∗ increases with
an increasing α—the coexistence region for C and D becomes
wider with increasing strength of the feedback. In region I, for
all measured values of α, the system relaxes to a steady state
with ρ¯ ≈ ρ∗ and b¯ converges to an intermediate value. For
example, b0 = 2.5 gives b(t → ∞) ' 1.2 [Figs. 1(c) and (e)].
This happens when the feedback in Eq. (1) is strong enough to
balance b. When b0 increases beyond bI,II∗ , the feedback from
the environment starts affecting b so much that the system hits
the all-D state. As a final note on Fig. 1(g), we see that bII∗,III,
separating region II∗ from III, increases monotonically with
α.
Next, we continue moving closer to the multiadaptive game
by introducing long-range links to every agent. At this stage,
they are distributed randomly and not open to optimization.
When the strength of feedback is weak enough (α = 0.1), ρ¯
shows a behavior similar to the case without non-local links
[see Fig. 1(b)]. However, the average density of cooperators ρ¯
as a function of b0 changes drastically when α is larger (α = 2
and 4 in Fig. 1). For example, if α = 2 then bI,II = 1.4, and if
α = 4 then bI,II = 1.2. That is to say that the region I where
the system converges to a state with ρ¯ ≈ ρ∗ = 1/2 shrinks
with increasing α. Strikingly, a new absorbing state ρ = 1 (an
all-C state) is appearing in the region II. This region thus have
three possible steady states ρ = 0, ρ∗ and 1, and which one the
system ends up in is a probabilistic event with a probability
of the various outcomes that depend on α and b0. In particu-
lar, there is a sub region in II where the system goes almost
surely to the all-C state. For example, between 3 < b0 < 4
and α = 4. This is different from the region II∗ (in the case of
no non-local links) above. Since non-local links shrinks the
distance scaling in the network (from N1/2 to logN or even
shorter) [12], C and D clusters have a larger interface, which
apparently is to the C cluster’s advantage. With increasing b0,
the probability that the system ends in all-C decreases, and
vanishes completely at bII,III. In Figs. 1(d) and (f) we display
typical trajectories of ρ and b for b0 = 1.1, 3.5 and 8.0 with
α = 4. These curves indicate that the system stabilizes to
a steady cooperation level after about 10 timesteps. By the
adaptive payoff dynamics, we can explain the transient oscil-
lations. Since each node is connected to a random partner by a
non-local link, it has a chance of connecting to any other node
and it is not too far-fetched to assume a well-mixed approxi-
mation. If we, furthermore, assume the strategy adoption rate
is proportional to the relative success of the strategies, then
one can approximate the dynamics by the following replicator
equation system
dρ
dt
=
{
ρ2(1 − ρ)(1 − b) if ρ ∈ [0, 1]
0 otherwise (4a)
db
dt
= α(ρ − ρ∗). (4b)
From the factors ρ2 and 1 − ρ in Eq. (4a), we see the fixed
points 0 and 1 of ρ. The ρ ' ρ∗ fixed point, however, cannot
be explained by these equations. From Eqs. (4), we can under-
stand the oscillatory behavior at least qualitatively. If we have
b > 1 and ρ > ρ∗, then b will increase and ρ decrease. After
some time, this situation will make ρ lower than ρ∗, i.e. db/dt
is negative. From this situation, with a decreasing b and ρ,
we will eventually reach a situation where b is less than 1. If
this happens before ρ hits zero, but after it falls below ρ∗, then
both ρ and b will start growing again. Overall, this describes
a cyclic phenomenon, which then, in practice, dampens out to
an intermediate, non-trivial fixed point, or hits the all-C or all-
D fixed point. We never see any sustained oscillations. Our
Java applet of the adaptive game with non-local links gives a
good illustration of how these oscillations look at a configu-
ration level [11]. Perhaps the most interesting observation in
this simulation is that there is an all-cooperator state for some
parameter values. As an illustration, consider the b0 = 3.5
curve in Fig. 1(d). At t = 1, ρ¯ decreases to almost 0. This can
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FIG. 2: (Color online) The average density of cooperators ρ¯ of the
multiadaptive model on randomly but locally connected lattice. Lo-
cal link are removed with a probability p = 0.1 (a), 0.3 (b), 0.5 (c),
and 0.7 (d). We use parameters α = 0.1, 2, 4 in all panels.
be explained by the strong initial temptation to defect. A few
cooperators survive and seed an increasing cooperator cluster
(cf. the replicator dynamics above). When ρ¯ becomes larger
than ρ∗, b starts increasing again, but here b is still too small to
stop the system from getting absorbed by the all-C state. For
large b0 (≥ 3.5), we see that ρ¯ approaches its final value mono-
tonically. For smaller values, however, we observe the above-
explained oscillations. In the interval b0 > bI,II, we see that
the system oscillates to wildly for the system to respond. This
has the consequence that it hits one of the fixed points. Fig-
ure 1(h) shows a diagram over the different dynamic regions
of α–b0 parameter space for this case with long-range links.
The inclusion of the long-range links obviously changes the
region-diagram quite considerably. We note that the bound-
ary value, bI,II, separating region I from II decreases with an
increasing α (bI,II ≈ 2 for α ≤ 0.1 and bI,II → 1 as α grows
towards 5), and bII,III, separating region II from III, increases
monotonically with α. In Fig. 1(h), we see that region II be-
comes wider with increasing α, meaning that in our model,
the presence of non-local interactions enhances cooperation.
III. MULTIADAPTIVE MODEL
In this section, we go one step further by considering not
only how interaction determines the evolution of cooperation,
but also how the interaction patterns themselves emerge, ar-
riving at the full model of Ref. [1]. To this end, we extend our
adaptive model by including a mechanism where the agents
are allowed to adjust their non-local links to maximize their
payoffs. As mentioned in the Introduction, we model strong
ties by keeping the local interactions fixed [1].
We update the state of the system, both strategies and non-
local links, synchronously. At a timestep, each agent plays the
NM game with all its local and non-local neighbors. After all
agents i collected their payoff, they look through their neigh-
borhoods and, in another agent j has a higher payoff, i adopts
j’s strategy, C or D, with a probability given by Eq. (3), and, if
it updates the strategy, it simultaneously rewires its non-local
link to the non-local neighbor of j. We require the graph to be
simple, so we do not allow self-links and multiple links.
In Fig. 3(a), we plot the average density of cooperators ρ¯ as
a function of b0 for three values of α = 0.1, 2 and 4. One can
note that ρ¯ shows qualitatively similar behavior to the adaptive
model with non-local links discussed in Section II. To be more
specific, also in the multiadaptive case there are three regions,
whose boundary values bI,II (bII,III) decrease as α increases. In
this case too, the system reaches all-C state for certain values
of b0 in region II, and the time evolution of b and ρ shows
similar transient oscillation behavior. Nonetheless, there are
quantitative differences. For example, the systems with b0 . 2
still shows steady-state behavior (ρ¯ ≈ ρ∗ = 1/2) for α = 4.
Thus, in region I, for all measured values of α, the system
relaxes to a steady state with ρ¯ ≈ ρ∗ and b¯ converges to a
stable value. For example, if b0 = 1.3 we have b(t → ∞) '
2.6. In addition, cooperation is more strongly promoted by the
adaptive networks as the defection is effectively more strongly
inhibited by the feedback from the environment to the payoff
matrices.
As a generalization of multiadaptive model, we consider a
probability p that each local connection of two-dimensional
lattice is disconnected. Thus, each agent has local links with
0 ≤ kl ≤ 4 and an adjustable non-local link. If p = 0 then it is
exactly the same as multiadaptive model above. Controlling
the probability p, we investigate multiadaptive models on the
percolation cluster with non-local connections. As shown in
Fig. 2, the density of cooperators shows qualitatively similar
behavior when p is small. Increasing p, all-C state disappears
when α = 4 from p = 0.5 (two-dimensional bond percola-
tion threshold). The boundary value separating region I from
II (II from III) increases with an increasing p. Thus, more
strong feedback is needed for the system to reach all-C state
as increasing p. From these results, we find that the local con-
nections are essential to support cooperation.
In the following, we will investigate in detail how other fac-
tors, such as restricting b, finite system size, influence the evo-
lution of cooperation and the interaction patterns among the
agents.
A. Multiadaptive model with bounded temptation
Unless the system has reached a steady-state with a finite
fraction (0 < ρ < 1) of cooperators, b grows (if ρ = 1)
or decreases (if ρ = 1) unboundedly. For example, in all-
C state the b will increase forever according to Eq.(4b). In
this situation, as the fixed points in any real system would be
metastable rather than permanent, b should not be overinter-
preted. In principle, one can say that when the fixed point
is reached is the end of applicability of the model. Alterna-
tively, one can patch the model by imposing a bound on b.
We limit the temptation in Eq. (1) by letting b(t + 1) = B if
b(t) > B and b(t + 1) = −B if b(t) < −B. The numerical re-
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FIG. 3: (Color online) Panel (a) shows average density of cooperators
ρ¯, as a function of the initial temptation b0, with α = 0.1, 2, and
4. Panel (b) shows effects of a bound on the temptation values as
b(t + 1) = B for b(t + 1) > B and b(t + 1) = −B for b(t + 1) < −B,
otherwise b(t + 1) follows Eq. (1). Used parameters are α = 4 and
β = 1. In panel (c) ρ¯ is plotted as a function of b0 for various size
L with α = 4 and β = 1, and panel (d) shows that bII,III increases
logarithmically with L.
sults for α = 4 of this modified model are plotted in Fig. 3(b).
When B is relatively large (B = 5), we see that the average
cooperator density as a function of the initial temptation looks
qualitatively the same as in Fig 3(a). That is, there are three
different regions corresponding to the same type of dynamic
behavior as in the unbounded case. In contrast, if b is more
restricted (B < 5), the region III (where the system sticks to
the all-D fixed point) disappears. In addition, in region II the
probability the system hits the all-C fixed point decreases as
B increases. Instead, region II where ρ converges to an in-
termediate value extends to larger b0-values. This gives some
perspective on the original model of Ref. [1]—if, in the un-
bounded multiadaptive model, the temptation to defect is too
large, the system gets into the all-D absorbing state easily be-
cause of the relatively slow regulation of b compared to the
faster regulation of ρ [according to Eqs. (4a) and (4b)].
B. Finite-size effects
Now we turn to a brief investigation of finite-size effects.
Figure 3(c) shows the results of ρ¯ obtained for systems with
linear size L = 16, 64 and 256. The parameters are α = 4 and
β = 1. As shown in Figs. 3(c) and (d), for larger system size,
the threshold separating the regions I and II, bI,II, saturates
with L, while bII,III(b0) increases logarithmically with L. In
particular, bI,II converges to 2, and bII,III scales as a ln L with
a = 0.70(4). In other words, the cooperative regions are more
stable the larger the system is.
C. Correlation between game and network structure
In this section, we turn to the relation between game dy-
namics and network topology. To simplify the analysis, we
will only consider the network of non-local links, disregarding
the links of the background square grid. In Fig. 4, we show ρk,
the fraction of cooperators or defectors of a particular degree
k in the well-converged state (t > 500). Our three different
regions (as defined by the cooperator dynamics) show differ-
ent network structure. For region I, represented by b0 = 1.1
[Fig. 4(a)], if k ≥ 3, cooperators have a larger ρk than de-
fectors. Furthermore, all nodes with k ≥ 41 are cooperators.
Since the final densities of C and D are equal in such situa-
tion, a high-degree cooperator can protect its neighbors from
invasion by defectors, and thus support cooperation. For re-
gion II, e.g. when b0 = 3.5 [Fig. 4(b)] the system is stuck
in the all-C state (i.e. ρk = 0 for all k), we find that ρk is
fairly close to a power-law with exponential cutoff and a de-
cay exponent is about 2.7. Since the final state, in this case,
is all-C, the payoff an agent can gather will be a linear func-
tion of its degree. Hence, during the rewiring process, the
probability of getting new links of the agents will roughly be
proportional to their current degrees. In growing networks,
“preferential attachment”—that the probability of a node to
receive a new link is proportional to its degree—is known to
generate a power-law degree distribution [13]. In this case,
where the networks are not growing Ref [14] shows that pref-
erential attachment needs to be balanced by an antipreferential
deletion of links in order for a power-law degree distribution
to appear. In our networks, the power-law-like degree dis-
tribution remains for larger b0 even though ρk, in the steady
state, varies. For systems in the all-D state, the rewiring pro-
cess works differently than when ρ = 1. Since the payoff of a
defector is degree independent, then its non-local link will be
rewired randomly to another D. This explains Fig. 4(c) where
we can see that the generated networks have a more narrow,
peaked degree distribution.
D. Emergent network structure
Now we will turn to the network structure of the multiadap-
tive game model extending the analysis in Ref. [1]. From Fig-
ure 4, we understand that the coevolution of the contact pat-
terns and the payoff matrix, in region II, changes the under-
lying network from its initially random graph with a Poisson
degree distribution to a skewed and fat-tailed degree distribu-
tion. In Fig. 5(a), we see that the cumulative degree distri-
bution (the probability an observed degree k is larger than K)
depends strongly on b0. This is especially true for b0 = 3.5,
where the distribution seems to follow a power-law scaling for
over two decades (which is quite much considering the rela-
tively small L = 100 system sizes). In Fig. 5(b), we make a
more detailed investigation of the hierarchical features of the
steady-state networks in greater detail. This hierarchy can be
characterized by the clustering coefficient (the fraction of pos-
sible triangles a node is member of with given the degree) of
a node with degree k. If the clustering decays with degree as
6100 101100 101 102100 101
100
10–2
10–4
10–6
10–8
100
10–2
10–4
10–6
10–8
 
 
k
C
D
 
k
C
 
k
D
b0 = 1.1 b0 = 3.5 b0 = 8.0
ρ ρ ρ
100
10–2
10–4
10–6
10–8
(a) (b) (c)
FIG. 4: (Color online) Correlations between the strategy and network structure. Circles (squares) correspond to the average density of
cooperators (defectors) with degree k, ρk. Panel (a) is for b0 = 1.1 (region I), (b) is for b0 = 3.5 (region II), and (c) is for b0 = 8 (region III). In
panel (b) the exponent of the power-law is 2.7 ± 0.1.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
C
kK
r
k
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
100
10–2
10–4
10–5
10–6
10–3
10–1
100 101 102
10–4
10–5
10–6
10–7
100 101
100 101 102
100
10–2
10–4
10–3
10–1
101
–0.08
–0.12
–0.16
–0.20
–0.24
b0
b0 = 1.1
b0 = 3.5
b0 = 8.0
P(
k 
≥ 
K
)
k n
n
b0 = 1.1
b0 = 3.5
b0 = 8.0
b0 = 1.1
b0 = 3.5
b0 = 8.0
FIG. 5: (Color online) Structural properties of network in the steady
state for different values of b0 when α = 4. Panel (a) displays the
cumulative degree distribution. Panel (b) shows the clustering coeffi-
cient C as a function of degree k. The line marks a scaling inversely
proportional to the degree. We investigate the degree-degree corre-
lations by plotting the average neighbor degree knn as a function of
degree k (c) and the average assortativity r as a function of b0 (d). In
plots (a)–(c) the initial temptation is 1.1, 3.5 and 8 respectively.
C(k) ∼ k−1 [16], the network is claimed to have a hierarchi-
cal structure wherein the nodes of highest degree connected to
a level below, which in turn connected to a level below, and
so on. This scaling quantifies the coexistence of a hierarchi-
cal structure of nodes with different degrees. This is indeed
what we observe for large b0-values. To investigate the de-
gree correlation between nodes at either side of an link, we
first measure the average degree of the nearest neighbors knn
as a function of degree, k [17]. If there would be no degree
correlations then, knn(k) would be degree independent. This
is not the case for large b0-values which is disassortatively
mixed, i.e. highly connected nodes have a tendency to be con-
nected to low-degree nodes and vice versa. [See Fig. 5(c)].
We also measure the assortativity r [18] as a function of b0 in
Fig. 5(d). The assortativity confirms the conclusion from the
cooperation level plots of Fig. 3—for the complex intermedi-
ate region II, the r is larger than in the other regions mean-
ing that relatively many large-degree nodes are connected to
other large-degree nodes, and low-degree nodes to low-degree
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FIG. 6: (Color online) Response to noise in strategy selection. ρ¯ as a
function of b0 for α = 4 with varying β.
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Noise effects on pairwise exponential compar-
ison dynamics. We show ρ¯ as a function of b0 for the same parameter
values as in Fig. 4(a).
nodes. Metaphorically, one can see the diversity of behav-
iors in this region as the result from a power struggle between
hubs, where the cooperator hubs win for some b0-values and
the defector hubs win for others.
IV. MULTIADAPTIVE MODELWITH NOISE
In this section, we test extensions of our multiadaptive
model to incorporate various types of noise.
A. Tuning the strategy-selection noise via β
In our multiadaptive model, α and b0 are the most funda-
mental parameters regulating the individual behavior. The pa-
7rameter β serves as a control parameter for the noise (or uncer-
tainty) in the selection process. More concretely, it can be re-
garded as the reciprocal of noise intensity [10]. The larger the
value of β, the less obvious the noise effect. Under the update
rule of Eq. (3), the strategy of a better performing neighbor
is likely to be adopted, while it is also possible (if unlikely)
that the strategy of a worse performing neighbor is preferred
occasionally. In the limit of β → 0 all information is lost,
that is, the agents are unable to retrieve useful information
from the interaction, and just switch to their strategies as by
tossing a coin. In order to study the noise effect on the evo-
lution of cooperation, we calculate how ρ¯ changes by varying
β. Figure 6 shows ρ¯ as a function of b0 for different β in the
case of α = 4. Qualitatively, ρ¯ versus different b0 are sim-
ilar, we find visible quantitative difference among them. In
particular, the range of the region II where the system evolv-
ing to all-C state expands to large b0 regime as β decreases,
and the threshold value bI,II separating the region I and II also
increases monotonously with decreasing β.
If one replaces the hard selection criteria that we use (fol-
lowing the Nowak–May game [8] and much of the subsequent
literature)—that an agents can only imitate a neighbor that
performs better than itself—by a softer probabilistic rule, fol-
lowing Eq. 3 also for negative u j − ui, then the system will
be more strongly affected by the noise. Potentially, such rules
can break cooperative states. In Fig. 7, we update the simu-
lation by such a random pairwise comparison dynamics and
notice that the all-C state of Fig. 4(a) is replaced by regions of
alternating higher and lower ρ¯. Still, in some of these regions
the cooperation level is well over 50% and independent of α
above some threshold (just like Fig. 7). We leave it for future
studies to investigate the origin of the complex b0 dependence
in the intermediate region and whether or not the model can
reach the all-C state with this type of updating dynamics.
B. Strategy mutation
In order to investigate the response of the all-C state to
noise, we proceed by adding a stochastic change in the strate-
gies. For simplicity, we start from a system consisting of only
cooperators in the steady state by setting the parameters α = 4,
β = 1, and b0 = 3.5. We try two cases where we flip the strat-
egy from D to C or C to D once every hundredth timestep,
either at the node of largest degree, or a random node. We
also test a case where the nodes flip with a random change.
The reason for the mutation rate is that we want to make the
system able to recuperate to an all-C state (which takes less
but about 100 timesteps [1]).
In the first case, the agent located on the node with the
largest degree changes its strategy to the opposite for every
time interval ∆. Here, we set ∆ to 100, which we believe is
reasonable since the cooperation density of the multiadaptive
model is stabilized after about 50 timesteps of relaxation. As
shown in Fig. 8(a), if D appears on the largest hub will be
rapidly spread to the whole system, and as a result all-C state
changes to all-D state. On the other hand, we observe simi-
lar phenomenon if a cooperator appears on the largest-degree
hub in an environment of all-D members—all D state will be
change to all-C sate shortly after the perturbation. Thus, the
system is alternatively switching between all-C and all-D.
In the second case, we apply the above perturbation to a
randomly selected node. From Fig. 4(b), we know that the
final interaction network has a degree distribution similar to
a power-law. This means that most of the players have small
neighborhood. Consequently, the disturbance is most likely
to affect nodes of low degree. In such situation, a disturbance
through mutation (or mistakes) cannot spread to the whole
system. This is because the high-degree cooperators can pro-
tect their neighbors from imitating defectors, like the behavior
seen in the region I of the multiadaptive model without noise,
where ρ¯ approaches to ρ∗ as t increases [See Fig. 8(b)].
The last type of perturbation we consider is that each agent
has a probability 2 × 10−6 to mutate per timestep regardless
of payoffs. Figure 8(c) shows the time evolution of ρ¯ when
applying this type of perturbation to an all-C state. A typical
picture can be seen in Fig. 8(b), the high degree C agents and
their neighbors are not affected so much since the strategy of
agents placed on nodes with low degree are mainly mutated
in the most of time, and ρ¯ fluctuates around ρ∗ as t increases.
Taken together, the all-C state needs to be stabilized by hubs;
once the hubs change their strategies by mutation, the all-C
state is no longer stable.
V. TIME SCALES
Up to now, we only investigated the case where the dynami-
cal variables in our multiadaptive model evolve with the same
timescale for network updates, strategy updates and feedback
to from the payoff of agents to the payoff matrix (b, to be spe-
cific). This similarity of timescales makes sense especially
in the context of evolution and population biology where one
timestep of the simulation corresponds to one generation (so
the time is naturally discrete). It could be appropriate in so-
cial systems too, whenever processes happen at the similar
timescales. However, there are also socioeconomic situations
that would be better modeled as having different timescales
for different processes. A natural way of implementing this
is to use asynchronous updating where, at every timestep, one
randomly chosen agent changes its strategy. By this method,
one can easily tune the timescales of the processes. Another
option is to use partially synchronous updates, where one of
the steps is synchronous, others asynchronous.
In this section, we consider distinct timescales for the up-
dating of agents’ strategies, the evolution of temptation and
the interaction structures. We first study the case of ran-
dom asynchronous updating. Here we go through all agents
in a random order (the order is different from timestep to
timestep). For each agent we updating its strategy and im-
mediately thereafter we readjust b and perform the rewiring
of the non-local link. We find that under the random asyn-
chronous updating scheme, the all-C state disappears from re-
gion II. This is in contrast to that in the case of synchronous
updating; see Fig. 9(a). This effect of the random update is
probably due to that now agents have more information, on
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FIG. 8: (Color online) Three cases of strategy noise via mutation
(change from D to C or C to D). The time evolution of ρ¯ for different
types of perturbations under the parameterizations α = 4, β = 1,
and b0 = 3.5. The strategy of an agent, who is placed on the largest
hub (a) or randomly selected node (b), is changed to the opposite
(flipping) for every time interval ∆t = 100. In the panel (c), each
agent has a probability 2×10−6 per timestep to regardless of payoffs.
average, to guide their decisions which strategy to use. Next,
we tune the relative timescales of the network and strategy
updating. To do this, we separate the probabilities for updat-
ing strategies and the social network, let P1(i → j) represent
strategy updating and P2(i→ j) for links rewiring, where
P1,2(i→ j) = 11 + e−β1,2(u j−ui) . (5)
The parameters β1 and β2 control the probabilities (hence the
speed, or timescale) of the evolution. Let us define the aver-
age time τ1 for link rewiring to be occurred once. The average
number of link rewiring occurred until time t, n1, equals to
tP1. The average time τ1 is in inverse proportional to n1, and
then τ1 ∼ 1n1 ∼ 1P1 . Using Eq. (5), we get τ1 ∼ 1 + exp−β1∆u,
where ∆u = u j − ui. Because we use best rule, the neigh-
bors payoff is always larger than is, u j ≥ ui. In sum, the
average time for link rewiring occurred once is a decreasing
function of β1. By the same calculation, the average time for
strategy updating occurred once is decreasing function of β2.
Thus, we can control the time scale of strategy updating and
link rewiring separately with β1 and β2. Given the feedback
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FIG. 9: (Color online.) An investigation of the effect of relative
timescales. The average density of cooperators for random updat-
ing (a), more frequent strategy updating (β1 = 1, β2 = 0.01) (b),
and more frequent link rewiring (β1 = 0.01, β2 = 1) (c). We set the
parameter α to 4.
strength α, the system has all-C state if the inequality β1 ≥ β2
is satisfied. Figures 9(b) and (c) show ρ¯ as a function of b0
for two different sets of parameters (β1, β2) = (1, 0.01) and
(0.01, 1) respectively. When strategy updating is more fre-
quent than link rewiring (i.e. β1 > β2), we observe a similar
behavior of ρ¯ versus b0 as in Fig. 3(a). On the other hand,
when link updating is more frequent than strategy updating,
the system never reaches the all-C boundary; see Fig. 9(c). In
region II, the system reaches either the ρ = ρ∗ or the ρ = 0
state, and the probability getting into all-D state increases with
increasing b0. The effect of more frequent link updating is
similar to the random dynamics in the sense that the all-C state
is lost. This suggests that the random dynamics efficiently
slows down the updating of strategies. From this, we learn
that the existence of the all-C state requires a comparatively
faster strategy dynamics compared to the link dynamics.
9VI. DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have studied a game-theoretical model
with feedback from the behavior of the agents to the rules of
the game, via the payoff matrix, and an active optimization of
both the contact structure between the agents and their strate-
gies. We investigate this model, first presented in Ref. [1],
by extending it in many ways. With respect to the average
cooperation density, the model is a nonequilibrium model (in
the statistical-mechanics sense). This makes the initial temp-
tation value b0 a crucial model parameter. Like in Ref. [1], we
identify three regions of distinct dynamic behavior for a large
parameter space and different generalizations of the model.
In region I, the average cooperator density relaxes to a sta-
ble level through damped oscillations; in region III the sys-
tems reaches an all-defect state. For intermediate b0-values
(region II), the system ends at one of three fixed points, 0,
ρ∗ or 1, with parameter-dependent probabilities. For some pa-
rameter values in this region, the original multiadaptive model
will almost certainly reach an all-cooperator state. This all-
cooperator state is absorbing, but when we extend the model
by adding noise, this state rarely appears. More precisely, if
the hubs of the network can mutate their strategies, the all-C
state will not be stable—the all-C state needs to be stabilized
by cooperator hubs. When we tune the timescales between
link and strategy updates, we find that the all-C state needs
a faster strategy update; if the link dynamics is to frequent,
then the all-C state is instable. An interesting aspect of the
all-C state is that has power-law like degree distribution with
a C ∼ 1/k scaling of the clustering coefficient (a hallmark of
hierarchical organization [16]). Traditionally, hierarchies are
usually explained as consequences of factors external to the
social system, e.g. age or fitness [19].
We use several different updating rules—random updating
with following the best (Fig. 7(a)) and updating rule with mu-
tation probability (Fig. 6(c)). Additionally, we investigate
the model with different updating rule, in which each agent
chooses the random neighbor and imitates his strategy with
the probability of Eq. 3. The system doesnt go to all-C state
anymore (not shown). We think this result is related to the
time scale of link rewiring. Under this updating rule, an agent
needs more time to find the most profitable neighbor with non-
local link. This means that link rewiring is effectively slower
than strategy updating. However, since this time-scale differ-
ence isnt explicit the average cooperation has high level (not
all-C) in some range of b0.
In the case of α < 0, we can expect the result obviously.
There is only one directional feedback, accelerating cooper-
ation or defection. Since the temptation of defect at initial
time (t = 0) is larger than 1 and the temptation is increas-
ing for ρC < ρ∗, agents prefer to act as defector and b is
always increasing. Finally, the system always goes to all-D
state. On the other hand, we can think quite narrow region in
α < 0 case. Suppose that b0 is small (for example, b0 = 1.01),
ρC(0)  ρD(0) (for example, ρC(0) = 0.99), and negatively
strong alpha (ex. α = −4). In this setting, the system reaches
the all-C state.
To epitomize, our work shows a generalization of spatial
social dilemma models where hierarchies can emerge in a co-
operative state. In our framework, these hierarchies need sta-
ble cooperating hubs to persist. In this sense, the hierarchies
are more the result of an all-cooperative state than a prereq-
uisite for its emergence. We note that in the literature, there
are conflicting results on whether or not hierarchy promotes
cooperation, or not [20]—in different games the effect can be
different.
We believe there are many interesting multiadaptive direc-
tions to for Nowak–May type spatial games. In this work the
interaction network and the payoff matrix is controlled by the
game, one can also imagine situations when the dynamics (the
timescales) is a outcome of the game dynamics and the agents
are more heterogeneous (so their payoff can be reinvested into
their ability to play the game).
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Appendix: Algorithmic description
In this appendix we give a more detailed description of the
multiadaptive model of Section III. The initial state of the
model is generated as follows.
1. Construct a L × L square lattice with closed boundary
conditions (so the corner vertices interact with two oth-
ers and the edge vertices interact with three others).
2. Connect every vertex with a random other vertex.
3. Assign strategies C or D randomly to all vertices.
4. Set b(t = 0) = b0.
Then, from the initial state the system is updated by doing
what is listed below. We describe the transition from timestep
t to t + 1.
1. For every vertex (in arbitrary order), calculate the
payoff with the interaction with the neighbors by the
Nowak–May rulesan interaction between a D and C
contributes with 1 to the score of the defecting vertex
and 0 to the cooperator, an interaction between two C
gives b(t) to both while two D gives no profit.
2. Go through all vertices and let them copy the strategy of
the neighbor (including themselves) that has the largest
payoff in the previous step, also rewire the long-range
link to the neighbor (excluding themselves) that has the
largest payoff.
3. Calculate b(t + 1) by Eq. 1.
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